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1 Introduction
International migration is a highly controversial issue both in political arenas and in the media. Fol-
lowing the recent inux of migrants into EU territories, a surge in anti-immigrant sentiment has
been recorded (Eurobarometer, 2018), matched by a dramatic fall in levels of trust in European Insti-
tutions and a hike in voter support for right-wing, anti-immigrant parties1. However, anecdotal and
academic evidence suggests that individuals are often poorly informed about the basic facts relat-
ing to immigration. A transnational survey carried out in 2014 by Ipsos MORI2 revealed that public
estimates of the level of immigration were more than twice actual levels: thus, on average, peo-
ple estimated 24% of the population to be made up of non-natives, when in reality it was only 11%.
Alesina et al. (2018) conrm this bias in native perceptions of both the number and the characteristics
of immigrants: in all countries included in their analysis, respondents greatly overestimated the total
number of immigrants; additionally, natives believe immigrants to be culturally and religiously more
distant from them and to be economically weaker – less educated, more likely to be unemployed,
poorer, and more reliant on government transfers – than they actually are. Ensuring these gures
are reported correctly is extremely important because, if better informed, citizens are more likely to
support more open immigration policies and higher levels of redistribution (Grigorie et al., 2020;
Facchini et al., 2016). Thus, the role the media play in informing citizens about immigration and in
shaping their beliefs and attitudes towards immigrants is critical (Benesch et al., 2019). In this paper, I
empirically assess the eect of early exposure to one of the main sources of information – the Internet
– on attitudes towards immigrants. More specically, taking advantage of a condential dataset that
allows me to link at the micro (municipal) level both attitudes and broadband coverage, I investigate
whether people in areas with higher rates of Internet penetration are characterised by a dierent
level of information on the migratory phenomenon and by distinct attitudes towards immigrants.
In the second part, I analyse how voting decisions are aected by Internet availability. Although it
is well documented that, over the last decade, the Internet has become one of the main sources of
news for Western citizens3, the eect this might be having on attitudes towards immigrants is by
no means a foregone conclusion. On the one hand, it seems evident that providing people with the
1See, among others, Dustmann et al. (2019); Halla et al. (2017); Barone et al. (2016).
2https://www.ipsos.com/ipsos-mori/en-uk/perceptions-are-not-reality-things-world-gets-wrong
3For instance, in 2013, 30% of European citizens reported that their rst source of news on political matters was the
Internet (Eurobarometer, 2013).
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possibility of going online is potentially an opportunity for making them better informed: indeed,
Internet users can consume and produce information without restriction and at a reasonable cost.
However, having access to more sources of information is not necessarily synonymous with greater
transparency. This is particularly true in the context of the Internet, in which the almost unlimited
possibilities of supplying information generate the risk of information overow. As a reaction, peo-
ple may concentrate their attention on a limited number of topics and areas that they want to hear
and read about, which may foster a degree of segregation and ideological polarisation (Mullainathan
and Shleifer, 2005). A second and related concern associated with the diusion of the Internet is
that this technology may crowd out traditional (and potentially more informative) news sources, the
experience suered by newspapers following the introduction of television (Gentzkow, 2006). In this
regard, both Nardotto et al. (2018) and Falck et al. (2014) nd that Internet availability reduced the
use of traditional media, especially (local) newspapers.
The setting for my analysis is Spain, a country which is particularly interesting for conduct-
ing a study of this nature. First and foremost, the case of Spanish immigration is unique, due to
both its magnitude and timing. Indeed, during the rst decade of the twenty-rst century, Spain
experienced one of the largest waves of migration in European history and saw its share of immi-
grant population increase from 1% at the beginning of the 1990s to around 12% in 2008. Second, as
highlighted by Hatton (2017), among European countries, Spain is the one in which the correlation
between press coverage and the salience of immigration is highest: this means that the degree of
importance that Spanish people attribute to immigration as a policy issue is highly related to the
attention that the media dedicate to the topic. Finally, particularly appealing data are available for
analysing this issue empirically. On the one hand, the diusion of broadband Internet in the country
can be tracked at a high level of geo-localisation; on the other, an exhaustive and representative multi
cross-sectional study on attitudes has been carried out by the “Centre of Sociological Investigation"
(Centro Investigaciones Sociológicas - CIS). Access to a restricted version of the latter’s ndings allows
me to investigate in detail just how well informed Spanish people are about the level of immigration
in their country and how they perceive the immigrants present in their territory. Pivotal to the iden-
tication strategy, the data also enable me to compare native attitudes towards immigrants before
and after the arrival of the Internet.
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Identifying a causal eect of Internet exposure, however, is far from straightforward. Indeed,
there may well be unobserved factors correlated with both changes in Internet diusion and atti-
tudes towards immigrants. In such a scenario, a simple OLS regression with Internet coverage as
the main explanatory variable would suer from problems of endogeneity. I tackle this issue in two
ways. The inclusion in the analysis of local xed eects, with observations drawn from both pre-
and post-Internet periods, allows me to address estimation biases due to unobserved time-persistent
factors. In a similar way to Campante et al. (2017) and Falck et al. (2014), I address the endogeneity
of Internet availability resulting from time-varying factors by looking at pre-existing voice telecom-
munication characteristics. More specically, I instrument the availability of the Internet with the
number of traditional telephone landlines recorded in 1996 in each municipality. Indeed, the dif-
fusion of the Internet is strictly correlated with the pre-existing level of development of landlines,
given that ADSL technology relies on data transmission over the user’s copper telephone line. In this
sense, a higher number of xed-lines is associated with lower costs in providing Internet availabil-
ity. At the same time, the wide diusion of landline telephones in 1996 and the fact that the national
provider (Telefonica) at that time was public – which meant the ultimate objective was to oer tele-
phone lines to as many citizens as possible – allow me to address any selection bias in households
provided with xed-line telephones. Clearly, the number of landlines was not randomly distributed:
following Campante et al. (2017), the identication strategy relies on interacting the instrument for
Internet availability with the time variation between the two periods (pre- and post- Internet), as-
suming that the only factor that changed the relationship between the number of xed telephone
lines and some unobserved characteristic was the introduction of broadband technology. In other
words, my identication strategy depends on the change in the impact of the number of landlines
on the outcome variables, assuming that whatever correlation existed between these elements did
not change when the Internet was introduced.
The results of this study show that, between 2008 and 2012, Internet availability generated dis-
tinct and quantitatively important eects on immigration-related issues. First, it changed the level of
information obtained by Spanish people about the migratory phenomenon and, in particular, their
perception of the number of immigrants present in the territory. Interestingly, perceptions about na-
tional and local numbers of immigrants dier remarkably. On the one hand, Spaniards living in areas
with higher Internet coverage are more likely to estimate correctly the percentage number of for-
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eigners present in the country and, in particular, they are less prone to overestimate their presence.
On the other hand, the Internet is associated with a misperception of local migration dynamics and,
if anything, with an upward-biased estimation of non-natives living in the respondents’ municipal-
ities. When asked their opinion on immigration, an increase in the number of natives claiming that
“immigration is good for the country" was observed in areas with high Internet coverage, despite
the absence of any dierence in the pre-Internet era (1995-1996). This result holds when relevant
personal and municipal controls – including the share and origin of the immigrant population in
the respondent’s municipality – were introduced as well as when several robustness checks were
conducted. Additionally, this eect is stronger among young and urban respondents, i.e. those indi-
viduals are more likely to obtain information online. Other measures of attitude – related to concerns
about the job market and competition for public goods as well as to worries about cultural distance –
are in line with this result, suggesting overall that the possibility of going online is responsible for an
increase in positive attitudes towards immigrants. Interestingly, these results are not without their
political consequences. Indeed, the CIS questionnaires report which party the respondent voted for
in the last election. In this regard, the Internet reduces the number of individuals that report having
voted for Spain’s traditional right-wing party, Partido Popular (PP).
This paper can be associated primarily with three strands in the economics literature. A large
body of studies has analysed the main channels via which native perceptions of immigrants are
shaped (see Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) for a review). The pioneer works looked at the impact
of immigrants on the labour market and public transfers (see, among others, Dustmann et al. (2005);
Facchini and Mayda (2009); Preston (2014)) as well as at the racial factor (Mayda, 2006; Dustmann and
Preston, 2007). A more recent development in the literature has identied another important factor
that might impact support for immigration: the role of information. In this regard, by conducting
online experiments, Grigorie et al. (2020) show that individuals provided with gures about immi-
grants (the proportion of legal and illegal immigrants in the U.S., the unemployment rate of immi-
grants, their incarceration rate, and the proportion of immigrants who cannot speak English) update
their beliefs and develop a more positive attitude towards immigration and look more favourably on
an increase in the number of legal immigrants. Similarly, in the case of Japan, Facchini et al. (2016)
nd that providing individuals with information about the potential social and economic benets
of immigration led to a substantial increase in support for a more open immigration policy. Lastly,
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Alesina et al. (2018) show that certain treatments of respondents’ perceptions of the number, origin,
and “hard working" nature of immigrants make them more favourable to redistribution. Here, using
a representative survey database that covers dierent periods in time, I seek to generalise the exter-
nal validity of my experimental results. Moreover, the high level of detail of the CIS study allows me
to identify the channels via which attitudes are impacted by new information.
Some studies have sought to determine whether the media have the capacity to shape attitudes
towards immigrants and if so how they do so. For instance, using data from the European Social
Survey, Héricourt and Spielvogel (2014) nd that individuals who spend more time informing them-
selves about social and political matters by reading the press or listening to the radio have a better
opinion of the economic impact of immigration. By contrast, in a recent paper exploring the link be-
tween mass media coverage and immigration worries, Benesch et al. (2019) show that the number of
media reports dedicated to migration issues is positively associated with concerns about immigration
among the German population. Unlike the studies reviewed above that, in the main, have analysed
the role of the traditional media, here, I focus on the digital media, or more specically, the Internet,
which has established itself as a source of news for an increasing number of citizens. In addition,
most of the studies conducted to date are only able to detect a correlation between the variables,
while, here, I specically address the endogeneity associated with the demand side of media using
a more rigorous econometric approach. Moreover, the relationship I examine between attitudes to-
wards immigrants and media coverage is much more precisely dened in geographical terms.
Finally, in terms of methodology (and, in part, of outcome variables), this paper is similar to recent
studies that have sought to evaluate the impact of the Internet on political outcomes4. In analyses
of German and Italian political elections, respectively, Falck et al. (2014) and Campante et al. (2017)
report a negative eect of Internet availability on voter turnout in parliamentary elections. A de-
crease in political participation was also found also by Nardotto et al. (2018) in a study of UK local
elections. In terms of party preferences, an increase in the vote share for a new, web-friendly party
(Five-Stars Movement was observed in areas with higher Internet diusion in Italy (Campante et al.,
2017); by contrast, no evidence that the Internet systematically benets single parties was reported
4For a detailed literature review of the impact of Internet and Social Media on political outcomes, see Zhuravskaya
et al. (2019).
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in Germany (Falck et al., 2014). However, despite the obvious importance of the inuence of the
digital media, little is known about other politically relevant outcomes that the Internet might have.
Indeed, attitudes towards immigrants can be especially malleable and they constitute a highly con-
troversial issue in recent political debates, which makes the way in which they are formed an area
of particular interest for academic study.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the Spanish con-
text, examining the development of Internet and analysing the country’s migration dynamics and
political situation; Section 3 describes the data used, focusing above all on the novel, condential
dataset provided by CIS; Section 4 outlines the empirical strategies used and analyses the eects of
Internet availability on the level of information about migration dynamics as well as dierent atti-
tudes towards immigrants; Section 5 studies the impact of the Internet on political outcomes; and,
Section 6 concludes.
2 Spanish context: Internet, Migration and Political background
2.1 Internet in Spain
Compared to other European countries, the diusion of broadband Internet in Spain has lagged be-
hind. The rst Internet connections ocially arrived in Spanish homes in 2000 while in 2004 the
rst ADSL subscriptions (1 Kbps upstream rate) were oered. However, according to Eurostat5, in
2012, broadband Internet was available in just 67% of Spain’s households, far fewer, that is, than in
many other European countries, including France (77%), the UK (80%) and Germany (82%) and even
below the EU27 average (72%). Moreover, according to a 2013 report by the European Commission6,
broadband access costs in Spain were the second most expensive in Europe. Nonetheless, during the
period that concerns us here, the share of households supplied by broadband (ADSL) technology rose
dramatically at the national level. Figure 2 in the Appendix reports the evolution taken by Internet
coverage in Spain between 2006 and 2015: as shown, in this period, the share of households supplied
by broadband Internet increased from less than 30% to almost 80%. Importantly for my identication
strategy, this variation is apparent not only across time but also spatially, given that dierences in
5http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/3433488/5585460/KS-SF-12-050-EN.PDF/39000dab-e2b7-49b2-bc4b-
6aad0bf01279, consulted on June 2018.
6https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/study-retail-broadband-access-prices-2013-smart-20100038
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the coverage of ADSL technology can be observed between the provinces of Spain (see Figure 3).
Note that, in theory, Internet applications may be multiple, ranging from gaming to providing
access to online services and platforms. Indeed, the literature examining the eect of the Internet on
electoral participation posits that one of the main reasons why the Internet makes citizens less likely
to vote is that, by having access to Internet, individuals consume more entertainment at the expense
of time spent on acquiring political information. Thus, it is critical to analyse how broadband tech-
nology is actually used when considering whether it might change attitudes towards immigrants.
In this regard, the annual “Survey on Equipment and Use of Information and Communication Tech-
nologies in Households", whose principal aim is to investigate the online habits of Spanish people,
provides an interesting picture: as Figure 4 shows, the percentage share of Spaniards using the Inter-
net to read online newspapers surged in the period considered, rising from 42% in 2008 to 64% in 2012.
This serves to conrm that the Spanish used the Internet to obtain online news and that, potentially,
this played a role in changing the level of information they had about politics and immigration.
2.2 Migration in Spain
As indicated above, the case of Spanish immigration is unique in both its magnitude and timing.
Compared to Greece and Italy, Spain was much less involved in the 2015 refugee crisis: of the one
million sea arrivals registered in Europe in 2015, only a few thousand reached Spanish shores. This
can be attributed mainly to its geography, that is, located considerably further than Greece and Italy
from the hotspots of Syria and the Middle East, from where the refugees were eeing. Despite this,
immigration has been very much an issue in the country in recent years. During the rst decade
of the twenty-rst century, Spain experienced one of the largest waves of migration, relative to its
population, in European history. Between 2002 and 2014, Spain received an accumulated immigra-
tion inow of 7.3 million and a net ow of 4.1 million, making it the second-largest recipient of
immigrants in absolute terms among OECD countries, after the United States (Brugel, 20157). This
demographic surge is clearly evident in Figure 5, which shows the total stock of foreign people liv-
ing in the country over time. Most immigrants came to Spain to work, attracted by the vigorous
economic growth that characterised those years, while a small percentage was composed of asy-
lum seekers (Jofre-Monseny et al., 2016). In terms of their country of origin, the immigration wave
7http://bruegel.org/2015/12/the-remarkable-case-of-spanish-immigration/
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was highly heterogeneous with the largest inows originating from Ecuador, Morocco, Romania
and Colombia. According to the National Statistics Oce, in 2017, the largest share of non-Spanish
people were Moroccans (16.4%) and Romanians (15%), followed by the English (5.3%), Italians and
Chinese (both 4.6%). Table A1 shows the change in the make-up of Spain’s foreign population over
the last twenty years. The average immigrant arriving in this period was relatively high-skilled: ac-
cording to the 2011 census, 55% (20%) were reported to have at least a secondary (tertiary) education,
a gure not that distant from the gure for the native population – 64% (31%). Moreover, this rela-
tively skilled supply of immigrants has been shown not to have damaged the native labour market,
in terms of the employment rate or wages (Carrasco et al., 2008), and to have actually increased both
native women’s labour supply (Farré et al., 2011) and the per capita income of provinces with high
immigration ows (Conde-Ruiz et al., 2008); Furthermore with respect to other European countries
with a smaller share of immigrants, Spain recorded lower growth in criminal activity in this period
(Alonso-Borrego et al., 2012).
2.3 Spanish Political Context
Traditionally, in Spain, the votes cast at the general elections were distributed among a very small
number of political parties. Until 2011, the two main parties, the right-wing conservative Popular
Party (PP) and the leftish Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE) split more than 70% of the vote.
Although it can hardly be described as xenophobic, the PP did, nevertheless, implement policies
in response to the exceptional waves of immigration described above that can be considered anti-
immigrant. For example, in 2012, the PP government introduced the controversial Real Decreto-Ley
16/2012, depriving access to healthcare to undocumented immigrants. This anti-immigrant stance is
further conrmed by quantitative content analyses of the party’s manifestos, which highlight a rela-
tively high proportion of references to the enforcement or the encouragement of cultural integration
(Volkens et al., 2012).
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3 Data
3.1 Attitudes towards immigrants
Despite the subject’s importance, national-level data describing attitudes towards immigrants are not
common and where they do exist, they are usually recent and not representative of a whole country
but just of its main cities. Additionally, more often than not, questions regarding attitudes towards
immigrants form part of broader (often multi-country) surveys, typically about citizens’ main con-
cerns or problems, with no specic focus on attitudes held. This, however, is not the case in Spain,
where a long, (almost) annual cross-sectional study has been dedicated to just this question. In the
survey, carried out by the Sociological Research Center - CIS (Centro Investigaciones Sociológicas)8,
Spanish respondents are asked several questions related to their opinion about the country’s immi-
grant population, their relationship with immigrants and their fears in relation to immigration. From
this survey, it is also possible to estimate the level of information – at both the national and local
level – about the immigration phenomenon, by looking at the respondents’ perceptions of the share
of foreign people present in the country and in the municipality. Finally, political preferences are
also detectable, as participants must indicate whether they voted in the last elections and, if so, for
which party they cast their vote. Importantly, this paper leverages a restricted version of the survey,
from which it is possible to discern the respondent’s municipality. This allows me to identify the
relationship between Internet access and attitudes towards immigrants with a level of geographical
detail that is rare in the literature. In my analysis, I use ve waves of the survey from 2008 to 2012,
the same span of years for which data on Internet penetration are available. Additionally, and pivotal
to my identication strategy, I use the (only) two waves carried out before the arrival of the Inter-
net, namely in 1995 and 1996. These two waves are largely comparable to the more recent ones –
both in terms of geographical representation and in terms of questions asked – and they allow me to
measure how Spaniards viewed immigrants before the development of broadband technology. Once
I combine the seven waves, the dataset – which, as well as the outcome variables I consider, includes
the respondents’ personal and social characteristics (including, gender, age, profession, social class,
employment status, level of education, etc.) – comprises 19,293 observations, of which 13,110 belong
to the post-Internet period (from 2008 onwards). Each wave includes at least 2,500 observation and,
overall, 866 dierent municipalities are represented, the mean number of observations per munici-
8http://www.cis.es/cis/opencm/ES/2_bancodatos/estudios/listaTematico.jsp?tema=82&todos=no
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pality being 109. Table A2 reports the personal characteristics of the sample while Table A3 reports
those of the municipalities in which the respondents live. All interviews were carried out in person
in the respondent’s house.
3.2 Internet Availability
Data on Internet availability are drawn mainly from the “Anuario Economico de España - La Caixa"
(Economic Yearbook of Spain), in which records of the number of broadband lines are provided for
2007, 2008, 2009 and 2012 at the municipal level for around 3250 municipalities 910. Dividing the
number of broadband lines by the total population in the municipality, I obtain the share of Internet
penetration. The same database also reports the number of landlines in 1996 at the municipal level,
and, as is explained in more detail in the next section, this information is used as an instrumental
variable for Internet availability. An additional source for measuring Internet penetration is the
aforementioned “Survey on Equipment and Use of Information and Communication Technologies
in Households". This source, however, has the drawback of being limited to the provincial level.
However, since it captures the online behaviour of Spaniards well, it is useful for undertaking a
descriptive analysis of these habits.
3.3 Demographic Data
Data for municipal controls (time invariant and variant), including population size and density, pop-
ulation composition by age bracket, unemployment level, the share of people with a high level of
education, number of household members, area and altitude of the location come from the INE (Na-
tional Statistics Oce) and from the 2001 and 2011 Spanish Censuses. Other relevant controls at the
municipal level, including number of cars, banks and commercial activities, as well as the number
of oces and cultural venues per capita are provided by “Anuario Economico de España - La Caixa".
Finally, data about the immigrant population, in particular the share and origin of immigrants, come
from Padrón Continuo, the main ocial Spanish register of foreign people living in the country.
9They provide data for all the municipalities with more than 1,000 inhabitants, accounting for 96.8% of the population.
10To address the lack of data on broadband lines for 2010 and 2011, I interpolate them using the recent ipolate Stata
command (see Cox (2015) for a comprehensive guide and Cobham and Janskỳ (2019) for a recent application).
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4 Impact on the immigration topic
4.1 Perceived Number of Immigrants
Overall, people tend not to be well informed about the dynamics of immigration. They show a lack
of knowledge about sophisticated facts, such as immigrant characteristics, and also about more basic
facts, such as the number of immigrants present in their territory. Being clear about these gures
is particularly important because, as experiments show, they can make people change their way of
thinking about immigration policies (Facchini et al., 2016; Grigorie et al., 2020). This information
can be readily accessed online and we would expect a greater diusion of the Internet to be associated
with a greater level of information about the migratory phenomenon. To determine if this is indeed
the case, I take advantage of the fact that, between 2008 and 2012, CIS questionnaires included a ques-
tion asking respondents to report their perception of the proportion of non-Spanish people living in
the country. Figure 6 shows the average share of non-natives that Spaniards thought were present
compared with the actual percentage. The graph stress that Spain is no exception with respect to
other European countries as respondents widely overestimated the proportion of immigrants.
To determine whether the Internet is associated with a dierent awareness among users of im-
migration dynamics, I run the following PROBIT Equation:
MigrationInfoi,m,t = β1InternetAvailabilitym,t + β2Xi,t + β3Wm,t + τt + ψp + εm,t (1)
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the individual i, living in municipality
m, has a correct level of information on the immigration phenomenon at time t. More specically, I
attribute a value equal to one to the dependent variable if individual i thinks that the percentage of
immigrants is between 11 and 15%, given a real fraction which, in that period, uctuated around 13%
The choice of this range is essentially linked with the way the questionnaire is structured. In fact, if
respondents answered “I don’t know" to the open question about the perceived share of immigrants
living in Spain, they were oered a battery of ranges (0%; from 1% to 5%; 6-10%, 11-15%; 16-20%;
21-25%; 26-30%; above 30%) from which they were asked to pick the one they thought to be the most
likely. In order to maximise the number of answers for the analysis, I transform the answer from
the open question to a categorical indication and selected as the correct range 11-15%. I also run the
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same equation where the dependent variable is equal to one if the respondents report that the share
of immigrants is above 15% - i.e. if they overestimate the number of immigrants. The main explana-
tory variable, Internet Availability, is the share of Internet coverage at the municipal level in year t. X
is a vector of individual controls of the respondent’s self-reported characteristics, including gender,
age, social class, working status, economic condition, level of education and political preferences. At
the same time, W controls for the characteristics of the location in which the individual lives, includ-
ing the population, the surface area, the population density and the altitude of each municipality.
These features are relevant insofar as they capture the level of urbanisation and any infrastructural
diculties in installing the Internet. Importantly, W also includes the share of immigrants present
in the municipality as well as their origin. Indeed, the cultural and ethnic composition of the immi-
grant population is an important element when natives are surveyed about non-natives (Lind, 2007;
Luttmer, 2001). To address this issue, vector W also controls for the share (over the total population
of foreign-born) of EU15, (Non-EU15) European and Sub-Saharan immigrants. Lastly, time and area
xed eects are represented by τt and ψp respectively. Specically, for this part of the analysis, I add
to the equation province11 xed eects (ψp), given that a battery of municipality dummies would
lead me to losing observations from municipalities that only appear in one wave. Finally, ε repre-
sents a robust error term clustered at the municipal level, while throughout the analysis I weight the
observations for the level of representativeness in the survey of each municipality per year12.
Table 1 reports the results: specically, the rst two columns refer to a correct perception of the
national immigration dynamics, while columns 3 and 4 examine the eect of Internet availability
on the probability of overestimating the number of immigrants. The coecients show that greater
Internet availability is associated with a higher probability of answering the question correctly. In
other words, having access to the Internet is reported as being associated with a better knowledge
of immigration dynamics in Spain. At the same time, the last two columns report that between 2008
and 2012 respondents living in areas with higher Internet penetration are less likely to overestimate
the share of non-natives in the country13. Both results are stable when municipal and personal con-
trols are introduced. The interpretation of PROBIT coecients is not straightforward; the second
11Spain is made up of 50 provinces, with populations ranging from 95,258 to 6,458,684.
12In the appendix, I provide results for the unweighted regressions, as well as when alternative weights are used, i.e.
the (log of the) population of the municipality.
13Results are consistent also when using higher thresholds, 20%, instead of 15%.
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Table 1: Information on Immigration - National dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Correct estimation Overestimation
Internet share 1.104*** 0.882** -1.240*** -0.801**
(0.400) (0.389) (0.296) (0.316)
Average Marginal Eect 0.239 0.186 -0.478 -0.290
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Observations: 11141 11141 11163 11163
Probit model. Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a correct
estimated range of immigrants living in the country (column (1) and (2)); Dummy equal to one
if the respondent reports an over-estimated range of immigrants (>15%) living in the country
(column (3) and (4)). Real share of immigrants: between 12.8% (2012) 13.9% (2009). Years: 2008-
2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects and are weighted for the number
of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-
age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level.
Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over
total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, % of non-EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African
Immigrants over immigrants population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level
in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
panel in the table shows the average marginal eects of the coecient which are helpful in this re-
spect: setting all variables to their means, a one-unit change in Internet penetration, increases the
probability of estimating the number of immigrants correctly by 18 percentage points.
I was also interested in determining whether this same trend held for the perception of immi-
grant numbers at the local level. Indeed, one of the potential eects of the diusion of the Internet is
that it may have accelerated the decline of newspaper distribution, most notably of the local press,
as found in Germany and in the UK, respectively by Falck et al. (2014) and Nardotto et al. (2018).
Indeed, newspapers are the most important source of information on local issues and local politics
(Bruns and Himmler, 2011) and it may be the case that the Internet might generate dierent eects
on the level of information about national vs. local immigration dynamics. This idea is conrmed
by Table 2, which shows the results for Equation 1, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to one if respondents correctly perceive the share of immigrants at the local level or if they over-
estimate their presence14. Indeed, totally dierent perceptions are detected when local immigration
dynamics are investigated. Spaniards living in areas with high Internet penetration are less likely
to estimate correctly the share of immigrants living in their municipality and, once personal and
14The dependent variable is constructed following the ranges used for the national level analysis.
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Table 2: Information on Immigration - Local dynamics
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Correct estimation Overestimation
Internet share -1.356** -1.430*** 0.334 0.791*
(0.619) (0.501) (0.596) (0.455)
Average Marginal Eect -0.383 -0.391 0.130 0.278
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes
Observations: 10803 10803 10803 10803
Probit model. Dependent Variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports a correct
estimated range of immigrants living in the municipality (column (1) and (2)); Dummy equal
to one if the respondent reports an over-estimated range of immigrants living in the munici-
pality (column (3) and (4)). Years: 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed
eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-reported)
Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic sta-
tus, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2,
population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants, %
of non-EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrants popu-
lation. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. * p < 0.1, **
p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
municipal controls are introduced, they seem to signicantly overestimate this share. This pattern
conrms that the Internet might have a dierential impact on the level of user information. On the
one hand, it makes people better aware of global/national issues; yet, on the other, they suer a loss
of information regarding local dynamics.
4.2 Attitudes towards immigrants: Empirical approach
Individual perceptions of and attitudes towards immigrants can be formed from dierent sources,
among which, the media represent one of the most important (Vliegenthart et al., 2008). Doubtless,
the media constitute a major channel of information and, as such, a key determinant of beliefs;
however, a priori, it is not clear in which direction access to news content might impact citizens’
views on immigrants, especially if we consider the highly self-segregated news platform provided
by the Internet. Here, I undertake an empirical analysis of this question by examining the responses
to the survey on attitudes towards immigrants that the CIS conducts on an almost annual basis. In
terms of its level of representation and detail, as well as the number of waves, this study is unique
in Europe. Additionally, the fact that I have been aorded access to the restricted version of the
survey means I have been able to identify the municipality in which each respondent lives and so
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I can study the relationship between Internet penetration and attitudes towards immigrants with a
topographical level of detail rarely seen in the literature. Equally important is the availability of two
earlier waves of the survey, corresponding to 1995 and 1996 – i.e. before the arrival of the Internet –
which, in terms of their geographical representation and questions asked, are largely comparable to
those conducted between 2008 and 2012. Specically, in all the waves, including those for 1995 and
1996, participants are asked several (identical) questions related to their perceptions of immigrants.
Among these, one of the most interesting seeks to evaluate Spaniards’ general attitudes towards
immigrants and is formulated as follows: “Overall, do you think that immigration is bad, good, or
neither bad nor good for the country?". Exploiting responses to this question both pre- and post-
Internet, I run the following equation:
AttitudeImmigrantsi,t = β1InternetSharem,t + β2Xi,t + β3Wm,t + τt + ψp + εm,t (2)
where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the respondent reports that immigration is
good for the country and 0 if (s)he has a dierent opinion (note, missing answers or “Don’t know" are
not included). As in Equation 2, here the main explanatory variable, Internet Availability, is measured
as the ratio between the number of broadband lines and the population living in a municipality and
is equal to 0 in the pre-Internet period. In this regard, it should be pointed out that broadband access
is a slightly better measure than penetration because the latter is obviously the result of endogenous
individual decisions. Additionally, in the robustness check, I run the same regressions with total
number of households in the municipality as the denominator rather than the population. As de-
scribed above, X and W are, respectively, vectors of relevant personal and municipal characteristics;
while τt and ψp represent time and area (province) xed eects, respectively.
As previously highlighted, Internet diusion is far from being random. Indeed, Internet suppliers
are more likely to invest in places where demand is potentially higher, given the characteristics of
the location and its inhabitants. These unobservable characteristics might potentially be correlated
with local perceptions of immigrants and the results derived from OLS regressions might suer from
problems of endogeneity. In line with the recent literature examining the impact of broadband tech-
nology on political outcomes, I address this issue in two ways. The introduction of local xed eects,
with observations from both before and after the introduction of Internet technology, allows me to
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overcome the estimation bias attributable to unobserved time-persistent factors. However, there may
still be some unobservable time-varying factors that aect both attitudes towards immigrants and
Internet availability. To address this issue, I instrument for Internet availability as follows:
InternetSharem,t = γ1(LandlinesShare1996m∗PostInternet)+γ2Xi,t+γ3Wm,t+θt+ζp+ηm,t
(3)
where θt and ζp are year and province xed eects. LandlinesShare1996 is the time-invariant
share of xed-telephone lines (over the total population) in municipalitym in 1996. Above all, in the
early phase, the diusion of the Internet was strictly correlated with the pre-existing level of devel-
opment of landlines, given that ADSL technology relies on data transmission over the user’s copper
telephone line. In this sense, a higher number of xed-lines is associated both with a smaller cost in
providing Internet services and with a greater proximity to the local telephone exchange (or Main
Distribution Frame - MDF)15. Figure 7 conrms the high correlation between the share of landlines
in 1996 and Internet penetration, while the spatial correlation is demonstrated by the maps in Figure
8. At the same time, I should stress another important point related to this identication strategy. In
1996, the use of the home telephone was very common. In this sense, low telephone network cov-
erage should be associated with diculties in bringing the telephone service into the municipality
and not with the individual’s choice of not having a telephone in the home. Moreover, the national
company responsible for the telephone service - Telefónica - was public at the time, which clearly
suggests that the ultimate goal was to provide a telephone service for the largest number of citizens,
even in areas where it was not economically viable to invest. This reinforces the idea that low tele-
phone network coverage should be associated with technical diculties (due, for instance, to the
nature of the terrain or the presence of mountains) in providing the service and not with selection
bias in households provided with xed-line telephones.
Although the demand for xed telephones in 1996 preceded the development of the Internet, it
is, of course, also related to certain municipal characteristics which, in turn, might be associated with
the municipality’s view of immigrants. Following Campante et al. (2017) to ‘net out’ the correlation
15One of the most commonly used instruments for Internet availability in the literature (Campante et al., 2017; Falck
et al., 2014) is the location of MDFs - which connect the central oce switches to lines that go into people’s homes.
However, data on their position in Spain are not available. Other instruments include location of backbones (Miner, 2015)
and rainfall (Nardotto et al., 2018).
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between our outcomes of interest and these characteristics, the instrument used in Equation 3 is
constructed by interacting the share of landlines with a dummy equal to one for the post-Internet
observations. In essence, I implement a dierences-in-dierences approach, ‘turning the instrument
on’ when the observations come from the post-Internet era. The identication assumption is that
any change in the impact of the number of xed telephone lines on the dependent variable occurs
only through Internet availability. In other words, I am ‘netting out’ the change in the eect of the
number of landlines of the variables of interest, under the assumption that any change in that eect
occurs exclusively through the new technology.
4.3 Attitudes towards immigrants: main results
Before describing the econometric results obtained with the identication strategy outlined above,
it is worth noting that, when it comes to attitudes towards immigrants, Spain today is an outlier. In
2018, it was the country with the highest percentage of respondents reporting that they would feel
comfortable having an immigrant as a social relation (more than 80% in contrast with an EU average
of around 55%)16. However, these attitudes were by no means prevalent during the period anal-
ysed here. For instance, in 2012, the percentage of people agreeing with the statement “Immigrants
contribute a lot to your country" was just 48%, one percentage point lower than the EU27 average
(Eurobarometer, 2012). Similar attitudes can also be observed in Figure 9, which shows the trend in
the nature of CIS respondents’ initial response, or ‘rst thought’ in relation to immigration. These
thoughts have been categorised as positive – or, at least, empathetic – (such as “inequality", “poverty"
or “lack of human rights"), neutral (“foreign people") and negative sentiments (“crime", “steal jobs",
“reduction in public goods"). As is evident, for most of the period of analysis (i.e., from 2008 to 2011),
the majority of respondents expressed negative sentiments in relation to the word immigration. A
shift in the trend, however, can be observed in 2012, when the percentage of respondents with em-
pathetic sentiments overtook that of those reporting negative sentiments, as is evident in the right
tail of the trend, this gap increased substantially in the last two waves (2014 and 2015). Additionally,
Figure 10 highlights two more interesting patterns. First, an inspection of the left-hand side of the
gure, which reports Spanish attitudes towards immigrants before the arrival of the Internet, reveals
no dierences in the rates of positive views between the municipalities with (future) high and low
Internet coverage. In 1995-1996, 41.3% of respondents living in areas with low Internet penetration in
16see https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2018/04/19/europeans-remain-welcoming-to-immigrants
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2008-2012 reported having positive attitudes towards immigrants: a very similar percentage to that
recorded in areas with future high broadband diusion (41.2%). This provides suggestive evidence
that the parallel trend hypothesis holds and, reassuringly for the identication strategy, that the re-
sults are not picking up some underlying trend in attitudes that just happened to be correlated with
the diusion of broadband. Second, as is evident from the right-hand side of the gure, in municipal-
ities with a higher level of Internet share, the percentage of respondents reporting that immigration
is good for the country increased, while a dramatic drop is observable in the “low-Internet" areas.
This pattern is conrmed by Table 3, which shows the results of Equation 2. The OLS coecients,
both with and without municipal and personal controls are positive and signicant, showing that
access to the Internet is associated with a higher probability of having a positive view of immigra-
tion. Columns (3) to (5) present the results when Internet availability is instrumented as described
in Equation 3. First, it should be noted the relatively high values of the F-Statistics and the strong
signicance of the rst stage, whose coecient has the expected positive sign. The IV coecients
are positive and the addition of personal and municipal controls does not alter the result. In the most
complete specication – i.e. when controlling for both personal and local features as well as for year
and province xed eects – the result is positive and signicant; additionally, the IV coecient is
higher, highlighting a downward bias of the OLS coecient. In terms of magnitude, the dierence
between OLS and IV coecients is similar to that found in studies that use similar identication
strategies (Falck et al., 2014; Campante et al., 2017; Nardotto et al., 2018).
Another potentially interesting outcome variable to explore are the responses to the question:
“Do you think there are too many immigrants in the country?". Here, too, the question was asked both
before and after the arrival of the Internet and, thus, the same identication strategy can be applied.
Table 14 in the Appendix reports the results, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one
if the respondent answered the question in the armative. Although not as strong statistically, the
results are qualitatively similar to those in Table 3, indicating a negative impact of the Internet on
the probability of considering there to be too many immigrants in the country.
Taken together, these results point to a number of interesting patterns. Internet penetration is
associated with a better knowledge of immigration dynamics, although this is limited to the national
context; by contrast, if anything, a negative relationship between broadband technology and aware-
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Table 3: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share 1.358∗∗∗ 0.834∗∗∗ 3.761∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗ 2.841∗∗
(0.190) (0.165) (0.760) (0.813) (1.136)
First Stage - - 0.177∗∗∗ 0.175∗∗∗ 0.168∗∗∗
F Test: 88.39 82.04 69.03
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of land-
lines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, popula-
tion density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
ness of immigration dynamics at the local level is found. In the case of attitudes towards immigrants,
Internet availability is responsible for an overall better view of immigrants. Indeed, the Internet in-
creases the probability that respondents believe immigration to be good for the country, while it
decreases the likelihood that respondents believe there to be too many immigrants in the country.
In the next sections, the robustness of these ndings is checked and I explore whether the results are
heterogeneous depending on the conditions.
4.4 Reduced form and robustness checks
Table 4 presents the results of the reduced form. Specically, the rst three columns display the
results when the equation is run for the post-Internet era, while columns (4) and (5) show the results
for the pre-Internet era. Taking the municipal share of landlines in 1996 as the explanatory variable,
a positive and signicant eect on attitudes towards immigrants is still generated in the 2008-2012
period, and while the coecient values are smaller, they remain comparable to the OLS in Table 3.
Reassuringly, no eect is found when the same equation is run in the 1995-1996 period: indeed, the
coecients in columns (4) and (5) are not signicant and they are close to zero. Additionally, Figure
1 reports the coecients of the reduced form equation estimated separately for each year, including
the full set of controls. As is evident, in the two years before the arrival of the Internet, the coe-
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cients are close to zero and relatively similar to each other; by contrast, a signicant increase in the
coecients can be observed from 2008 onwards.
Table 4: Positive view (OLS regressions) - Reduced form
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post-Internet era Pre-Internet era
Telephone 96 share 0.533∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 0.408∗∗∗ 0.0467 -0.0684
(0.0748) (0.0786) (0.105) (0.182) (0.211)
Municipal Controls: No No Yes No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes Yes No Yes
Observations: 17036 17036 17036 4691 4691
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the
country" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 2008-2012 (Columns 1-3); 1995-1996 (Columns 4-5). All re-
gressions include year and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year.
Explanatory Variable: share of landlines in 1996. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class,
occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface
in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan
African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Figure 1: Coecients from the reduced-form regressions, controls included
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Tables 15 to Table 19 in the Appendix provide robustness checks on the results presented in Table
3. First, given the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, Table 15 presents the results using a
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Probit and an IV Probit approach: as is evident, the coecients are comparable in terms of direction
and level of signicance; however, during my analysis, I prefer to implement an OLS / IV approach
because the results can be interpreted more readily. Furthermore, Table 16 shows the coecients
when the population weights are not used. Indeed, taking advantage of the local representativeness
of the inquiry, throughout the analysis I weighted the observation by the number of respondents
for each municipality in each year. However, it is important to check that the results are not driven
by the weights, as conrmed by Table 16. Similarly, Table 17 presents the results when using an
alternative weight, namely the (log of) population of the municipality. Indeed, when it comes to
survey data, weighting the population observations is useful so as to increase the level of national
representativeness (Johnson, 2008). In this case too, the results hold. My main explanatory variable
gives rise to an additional concern due to the fact that it might potentially suer from a measurement
error as I divide the number of broadband lines by the total population of the municipality rather than
by the number of households. The housing censuses of 2001 and 2011 are useful here for addressing
this issue, given that they provide the number of households at the municipal level for these two
years. Thus, in Table 18, I calculate the Internet penetration dividing the number of broadband lines
by the number of households in 2011 whereas the instrument is calculated as the share of the number
of telephone lines in 1996 over the total number of households in 2001. As is evident, results are
almost unchanged when this Internet measure is used, despite a clear reduction in the magnitude of
the coecient. On the one hand, this approach has the advantage of providing a measure closer to the
real Internet penetration rate; by contrast, it suers from a measurement error linked with the fact
that it does not capture the change in the population. Given that the relevance of this measurement
error is unknown, throughout my analysis, I prefer to calculate the Internet penetration rate by
looking at the time-varying population. Finally, another source of concern might derive from the fact
that my instrumented explanatory variable, Internet Availability, is calculated at the municipal level,
while the dependent variable and the personal controls are at the individual level; this mismatch may
weaken my identication strategy. I address this concern by collapsing the analysis at the municipal
level – i.e. using as a dependent variable the share of individuals with a positive view over the total
number of respondents in the municipality. As shown in Table 19, the results remain stable with this
approach.
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4.5 Additional results
In this section, I explore potential mechanisms that might drive this pattern by looking at other
attitudinal indexes. A large body of literature has studied the main channels via which native per-
ceptions of immigrants are shaped. Overall, natives seem to be concerned about immigration as they
fear competition in the labour market (Mayda, 2006) and reduced access to public goods (Facchini
and Mayda, 2009). Cultural and ethnic dierences in the immigrant population are a further source
of worry (Dustmann and Preston, 2007). The CIS survey is particularly suitable for studying the
mechanisms that shape respondents’ attitudes, given that questions related to the above concerns
are put to them. The three concerns – related, that is, to the labour market, public goods and cul-
tural distance – are likely to correlate with the general attitudes expressed and studied up to this
point. Indeed, this intuition is conrmed by Table 5. In this table, I focus my attention on individuals
with negative attitudes to immigrants; that is, I attribute to the dependent variable a value equal
to one if the respondent reports believing that immigration is bad for the country (while a value
of 0 is attributed if (s)he believes that it is good or neither good nor bad). Columns (1) to (5) show
the results for dierent potential attitude-related mechanisms. Specically, columns (1) and (2) in-
vestigate job market competition concerns, assigning a value equal to one if the respondent agrees,
respectively, with the statements: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives" and “Immigrants force native
salaries down"; column (3) examines concerns related to competition for public goods, by attributing
a dummy equal to one if the respondent believes that immigrants should not obtain unemployment
subsidies; nally, in columns (4) and (5), cultural distance is examined, by determining whether the
individual agrees, respectively, with the following statements: “Immigrants should renounce their
own culture" and “Immigrants should not be able to obtain Spanish nationality". As is evident, all
the coecients are positive and strongly signicant, stressing a high correlation between a gener-
ally negative attitude towards immigrants and the mechanisms mentioned above. The results do not
change if all the dummies are introduced simultaneously (column (6)).
In order to understand which of these potential channels are most aected by the Internet, I run
the instrumented version of the equation 2, where the dependent variables are dummies equal to one
if the respondent agrees with the above statements mentioned, taking advantage of the fact that the
same question was asked in the surveys both before and after the arrival of the Internet. Tables 6 - 8
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Table 5: Channels that explain why immigration is something bad (OLS regressions)
Immigration is overall bad for the country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Steal jobs from natives 0.315∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.0137) (0.00752)
Reduce salaries 0.198∗∗∗ 0.0690∗∗∗
(0.00516) (0.00487)
Unempl. benet 0.385∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
(0.0245) (0.0413)
Renounce their culture 0.272∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.0337) (0.0402)
No Spanish nationality 0.343∗∗∗ 0.179∗∗∗
(0.0108) (0.0102)
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 16238 16088 16266 16547 15336 13631
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is bad for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Explanatory variables: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with
the following statements: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives"; “Immigrants force native salaries down"; “Immigrants
should not obtain unemployment subsidies"; “Immigrants should renounce their own culture"; “Immigrants should not be
able to obtain Spanish nationality". Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects
and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age,
squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal con-
trols: population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants
and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal
level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
23
(and, in the Appendix, Tables 20 and 21) report the results, following a similar structure to that em-
ployed in Table 3 – i.e. reporting the OLS and the IV coecients with year and province xed eects,
with and without controls. Overall, the results are signicant and consistent with those presented in
Tables 3 and 14, conrming that Internet availability is responsible for an improvement in attitudes
towards immigrants. In the case of concerns related to competition in the labour market, the Inter-
net reduces the percentage number of Spaniards believing that immigrants steal jobs from natives
and that their presence drives native salaries down (Tables 6 and 20). Moreover, the Internet plays
a role in relation to concerns about increased competition for public goods: broadband technology
generates a reduction in the percentage number of respondents claiming that immigrants should
not obtain unemployment subsidies, as reported in Table 7. Finally, although the coecients related
to this channel are statistically weaker, the Internet alleviates native fears attributable to cultural
distance: indeed, a decrease in the number of people claiming that immigrants should not be able
to obtain Spanish nationality is observable as well as among those that believe immigrants should
renounce their own culture once they settle in Spain, as is evident from Tables 8 and 21, respectively.
Table 6: Immigrants steal jobs from natives (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.896∗∗∗ -0.232 -3.124∗∗∗ -2.064∗∗∗ -1.479∗∗
(0.160) (0.150) (0.444) (0.474) (0.584)
F Test: 18.13 17.17 15.88
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17573 17573 17573 17573 17573
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives
". Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of
respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported)
Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and
education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total
population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard
errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
4.6 Heterogeneity analysis
Finally, it is interesting to determine whether the Internet may have a dierent impact on attitudes
towards immigrants depending on the respondents’ personal characteristics or the characteristics
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Table 7: Immigrants should not obtain unemployment subsidies (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.255∗∗∗ -0.139∗ -0.797∗∗ -0.656∗∗ -0.597∗
(0.0838) (0.0809) (0.317) (0.329) (0.360)
F Test: 18.34 17.41 14.51
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17598 17598 17598 17598 17598
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigrants should not obtain
unemployment subsidies". Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects and are
weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post
Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic
status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population density, alti-
tude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant
population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 8: Immigrants should not be able to obtain Spanish nationality (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.622∗∗∗ -0.362∗∗ -1.566∗∗∗ -1.190∗∗ -0.678
(0.147) (0.144) (0.527) (0.487) (0.676)
F Test: 18.33 17.29 15.65
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 16555 16555 16555 16555 16555
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigrants should not be able
to obtain Spanish nationality". Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year
and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable:
share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class,
occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface
in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan
African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
of the municipality in which they live. Tables 9 and 10 show the results associated with Equation 2
when splitting the sample according to characteristics of the municipality (below vs. above the me-
dian) or the respondent. However, it should be noted that in order not to lose statistical power, in this
part of the analysis the standard errors are not clustered (this explains the high value of the F-test).
To check if the eect is statistically dierent, the tables also report the p-value for a test of equality
of coecients for Internet share across the subsamples. Table 9 presents interesting ndings with
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regard to the characteristics of the municipality. First, the eect of the Internet on attitudes seems
to be particularly strong for respondents living in densely populated areas. In addition, there is no
dierential eect depending on the presence of immigrants (the p-value between low and high share
of immigrants is not signicant). However, in this sense, the origin of foreigners is relevant: the im-
pact of the Internet on positive attitudes towards immigrants is statistically dierent (stronger) for
respondents living in municipalities with a low share of immigrants of sub-Saharan origin. Table 10
presents ndings with regard to the personal characteristics of the respondents. As is evident, there
does not seem to be a dierence in the impact of the Internet according to the gender of the respon-
dent. Likewise, employment status (unemployed vs employee) does not generate dierences in the
eect of the Internet. By contrast, the level of education plays a relevant role: indeed, the eect of
the Internet on the attitudes of individuals with a low level of education (primary or lower) is weaker
and statistically dierent compared to people with a university education. Finally, a further personal
characteristic that is worth investigating is the age of the interviewer. Indeed, Internet usage is more
frequent among the younger generations. In this regard, I expect to nd some heterogeneity in my
results when comparing young vs old respondents. Table 11 reports the most complete specica-
tion (including clustered standard errors) of Table 3 by age quintile. As expected, the magnitude
and statistical signicance of the coecients is, overall, higher for younger respondents. Indeed, the
eect is particularly strong for individuals aged between 31-40 and 41-52, i.e. those whom anecdotal
evidence suggests are more likely to use the web for consuming information. By contrast, the coef-
cient for those over the age of 53 is smaller and not statistically signicant. Lastly, as reported in
Table 22 and 23, respectively, no signicant dierences are noted when it comes to concerns about
job market competition (i.e. when considering whether the respondent agrees with the statement:
“Immigrants steal jobs from natives") and the distribution of public goods (“Immigrants should not
obtain unemployment subsidies").
5 Impact on political preferences
In this section, I evaluate the impact of the Internet on political outcomes. Specically, I analyse the
relationship between voting behaviour and attitudes towards immigrants; additionally, I investigate
whether the political success of the right-wing conservative party, the Partido Popular (PP), has been
aected by the arrival of the Internet. Indeed, if voters consume online news according to their po-
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Table 9: Positive view: Heterogeneity Analysis - Munic. Characteristics (IV Regressions)
Immigration is overall bad for the country
Pop. Density Immigrant (%) African Immigrant (%)
Low High Low High Low High
Internet share 1.323 2.239∗∗∗ 2.529∗∗ 4.355∗∗ 3.058∗∗∗ 0.535
(0.931) (0.542) (1.249) (1.902) (0.709) (0.761)
Eq. of coef. (p-value) 0.031 0.411 0.060
F Test: 82.26 1594.2 9.054 49.40 1088.5 292.1
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 8324 8712 7029 10007 7467 9569
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of land-
lines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, popula-
tion density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. The row “Eq. of coef. (p-value)" refers to the p-value for a test of equality of coecients for
Internet share across the subsamples. Low and High refers to the municipalities with population density, share of immi-
grant and share of Sub-Saharan immigrants below vs above the median. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗
p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 10: Positive view: Heterogeneity Analysis - Personal Characteristics (IV Regressions)
Immigration is overall bad for the country
Gender Working Status Education
Female Male Working Unempl. Low High
Internet share 3.422∗∗∗ 2.015∗∗ 3.087∗∗∗ 4.977∗∗∗ 1.537∗∗ 2.989∗∗∗
(0.804) (0.809) (0.754) (1.497) (0.710) (1.011)
Eq. of coef. (p-value) 0.336 0.911 0.021
F Test: 679.4 684.4 748.7 185.0 709.5 492.5
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 8591 8445 9264 2882 8295 6970
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of land-
lines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, popula-
tion density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. The row “Eq. of coef. (p-value)" refers to the p-value for a test of equality of coecients for
Internet share across the subsamples. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 11: Positive view (IV regressions): Heterogeneity Analysis - By age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Age: 18-30 31-40 41-52 53-65 >66
Internet share 3.588∗∗ 4.135∗∗∗ 4.739∗∗∗ 2.003 0.361
(1.563) (1.176) (1.361) (1.734) (1.481)
F Test: 15.93 12.99 14.96 16.38 15.47
Municipal Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 3706 3351 3566 3378 3035
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of land-
line in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational
status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, popula-
tion density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
litical preferences, this should not alter support for the parties. At the same time, if the diusion of
the Internet aected voter opinions on politically relevant issues – as demonstrated in the previous
section with attitudes towards immigrants – this might also lead to a change in political behaviour.
To evaluate this issue empirically, I implement an identication strategy similar to the one employed
so far in this study, focusing on those individuals who report having voted for the PP, leveraging that
in all the waves, including those in the ‘pre-Internet’ era, respondents were asked which party they
voted for in the last election.
First, Table 12 produces evidence that the attitudes of PP voters towards immigrants are dierent.
Controlling for personal and municipal characteristics, individuals who report having voted for this
right-wing party are less likely to say that immigration is good for the country (Column (1)). Simi-
larly, the other measures of attitude strongly correlate with political behaviour: PP voters are more
likely to be concerned about immigrants due to fears concerning the job market and competition for
public goods (Columns (2) and (3), respectively). Furthermore, they are more likely to report that
immigrants should not be allowed to obtain Spanish nationality. Overall, these results are in line
with those reported by Barone et al. (2016) in the Italian context; however, my sample is bigger and,
arguably, more representative.
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Table 12: Factors accounting for the relationship between
immigration and voting for the centre-right
Voting for PP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Immigration is good -0.105***
(0.0154)
Steal Job 0.102***
(0.0205)
No Subsidy 0.0649***
(0.0107)
No Nationality 0.121***
(0.0176)
Municipal Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Personal Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 13835 14308 14298 13464
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports having voted
for the PP in the last elections (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded; respon-
dents reporting not having voted in the last elections excluded). Years 1995, 1996;
2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects and are weighted
for the number of respondents per municipality-year. (Self-reported) Personal con-
trols: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status
and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in Km2, population
density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and %
of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard
errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses.* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01
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Having established a relationship between conservative party voters and attitudes towards im-
migrants, as well as a relationship between the Internet and these attitudes, an additional question
I seek to address is whether and how the Internet has impacted voting behaviour. I, thus, run the
instrumented version of Equation 2, where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to one if the
respondent reported having voted for the PP in the last election (excluding those respondents who
reported not having turned out). Table 13 reports the results. Among the individuals that took part in
the CIS survey, the Internet seems to have a negative eect – which proves to be signicant when the
IV approach is used – on the probability of voting for the PP. This result is conrmed in Appendix C
when the actual election results are investigated: comparing a battery of national elections between
1996-2000 - i.e. before the arrival of the Internet - to the ones that occurred between 2008-2011, I nd
evidence that the conservative political force Popular Party (PP) is seen to be signicantly worse o
after the diusion of the Internet.
Table 13: Internet impact on PP votes (OLS and IV regression)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.0792 -0.187 -0.871∗ -0.925∗ -1.645∗∗
(0.141) (0.140) (0.495) (0.524) (0.722)
F Test: 17.46 16.36 15.96
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 15153 15153 15153 15153 15153
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent reports having voted for the PP in the last elections (Blank
and Don’t know answers excluded; respondents reporting not having voted in the last elections excluded). Years 1995,
1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents
per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal
controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status and education level. Municipal con-
trols: population, surface in Km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants
and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal
level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
6 Conclusion
Since 2014, 1.8 million refugees have arrived in Europe, more than 1 million of them in 2015 alone.
This immigration crisis has been associated with far-reaching changes in the political scenario in
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many countries of the European Union: the surge in the number of immigrants has been matched
by a dramatic fall in the level of trust in European Institutions and a hike in voter support for right-
wing, populist parties (Barone et al., 2016; Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019). The media, and
especially the Internet, have played a role in shaping these reactions: indeed, the last few years have
been characterised by a peak in the diusion, especially via social platforms, of fake news which has
impacted political outcomes and people’s beliefs about immigration (Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017;
Pennycook and Rand, 2018). This study has sought to determine whether the Internet has been a
source of misinformation about immigration dynamics from the outset and whether there has been
a shift in attitudes from those days when the social media were less prevalent and fake news was
not an issue. More specically, this paper has examined the role played by early Internet availability
on political and migration-related outcomes in Spain, a country that, in the rst decade of the 2000s,
experienced an inow of immigrants comparable (if not higher) in quantitative terms to the numbers
recorded during the most recent European refugee crisis.
Here, I have explored whether access to the Internet has made citizens more conscious of the
dynamics of immigration and whether, at the same time, it has changed the way they perceive im-
migrants. The results found were, in part, unexpected. First, while higher Internet exposure is
associated with a better knowledge of immigration dynamics at the national level – citizens liv-
ing in areas where broadband Internet coverage is higher were more likely to know the share of
non-natives living in Spain and were less prone to overestimate this percentage – respondents in
municipalities with high Internet penetration seem to have greater misperceptions when it comes to
the dynamics of local immigration. Second, despite the absence of any dierences in the pre-Internet
era, respondents with greater Internet availability were more likely to hold a positive view of the
immigration phenomenon in the post-Internet period. This generally more positive attitude is more
prevalent among younger generations and is further conrmed when more specic outcomes are
investigated, including fear of competition in the job market, the redistribution of public goods and
ethnic diversities – the main factors inuencing native perceptions of immigrants.
These results are not without their consequences. Indeed, attitudes to immigration can be con-
sidered a major driver of voting behaviour and this is made evident in the second part of the paper.
Here, respondents that report casting their vote for the Partido Popular – Spain’s traditional right-
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wing party – are characterised by dierent (i.e. worse) attitudes towards immigrants, while the
results of this conservative party have been worse since the diusion of the Internet. If we combine
these two outcomes, it is possible to hypothesise that the availability of a new cheap source of infor-
mation – the Internet – has made the Spanish more conscious of immigration dynamics and reduced
their migration-related fears; this, in turn, has driven Spanish voters to punish the conservative par-
ties for promoting restrictive immigration policies.
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Figure 2: Share of households covered by ADSL, national level (2006-2015)
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Figure 3: Share of households covered by ADSL, province level (2006-2012)
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Figure 4: Share of households reading news online
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Figure 5: Total inow of foreign people in Spain (1996-2017)
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Figure 6: Real vs perceived share of immigrants, by year (2008-2012)
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Figure 7: Correlation between share of landlines in 1996 and share of broadband, municipal level
(2008-2012)
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Figure 8: Geographical distribution of landlines and broadband lines
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Figure 9: Sentiments (‘rst thought’) in relation to immigration (2008-2015)
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Figure 10: Share of respondents with a positive view of immigrants, over Internet penetration
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Appendix B: List of Tables
Table 14: Too Many (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.693∗∗∗ -0.223 -2.192∗∗ -1.191 -0.444
(0.219) (0.168) (0.983) (0.983) (1.279)
F Test: 89.76 82.90 70.29
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17267 17267 17267 17267 17267
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “There are too many immigrants
in the country" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year
and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable:
share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class,
occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface
in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan
African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. ∗
p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 15: Positive view (PROBIT and IVPROBIT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share 3.560∗∗∗ 2.376∗∗∗ 9.589∗∗∗ 8.350∗∗∗ 7.815∗∗
(0.504) (0.469) (1.873) (2.214) (3.058)
First Stage 0.142∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.0715∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.023) (0.027)
F Test: - - 34.52 32.10 27.57
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Probit and IV Probit model. Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Im-
migration is good for the country" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions
include year and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumen-
tal Variable: number of landline in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age,
social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: (log of)
population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and
% of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal level in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 16: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) - Not weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share 0.825∗∗∗ 0.545∗∗∗ 3.743∗∗∗ 2.639∗∗∗ 2.871∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.117) (0.769) (0.736) (0.835)
First Stage - - 0.136∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.0621∗∗∗
F Test: 26.86 23.82 18.73
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the
country" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects. Instrumental Variable: share of landline in 1996 (over the total households of municipality) * Post Internet
dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status,
political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude,
% immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant
population. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 17: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) - Alternative weight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share 0.909∗∗∗ 0.588∗∗∗ 3.839∗∗∗ 2.775∗∗∗ 3.038∗∗∗
(0.137) (0.121) (0.732) (0.719) (0.809)
First Stage - - 0.142∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗ 0.0809∗∗
F Test: 33.62 29.79 24.81
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects are weighted for the (log of) population of the municipality. Instrumental Variable: share of landline in
1996 (over the total households of municipality) * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age,
squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal con-
trols: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants
and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal level
in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 18: Positive view (OLS and IV regressions) - Alternative Internet
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share 0.444∗∗∗ 0.305∗∗∗ 2.435∗∗∗ 2.059∗∗∗ 1.620∗∗∗
(Total hh) (0.0704) (0.0587) (0.461) (0.470) (0.371)
First stage 0.157∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗
F Test: 30.76 28.59 42.00
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17036 17036 17036 17036 17036
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the
country" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of
landline in 1996 (over the total households of municipality) * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls:
gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level.
Municipal controls: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of
EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered
at municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 19: Positive view - Municipal level collapsed
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share 0.637∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 3.608∗∗∗ 2.500∗ 2.995∗
(0.118) (0.114) (1.090) (1.351) (1.734)
First Stage - - 0.0987∗∗∗ 0.0663∗∗ 0.0596∗
F Test: 12.25 6.357 4.771
Municipal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 1540 1498 1540 1540 1498
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigration is good for the coun-
try" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province
xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of land-
line in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: (municipal average of) gender, age, squared-age,
social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: popu-
lation, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and %
of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. Robust standard errors clustered at municipal level in
parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 20: Immigrants force native salaries down (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.866∗∗∗ -0.438∗∗∗ -2.208∗∗∗ -1.476∗∗∗ -0.194
(0.121) (0.115) (0.376) (0.448) (0.659)
F Test: 18.55 17.58 13.37
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17348 17348 17348 17348 17348
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigrants force native salaries
down". Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed eects and are weighted for the
number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landline in 1996 * Post Internet dummy.
(Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status, economic status, political
preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in km2, population density, altitude, % immigrants
over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants over immigrants population.
Standard errors partially clustered at municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 21: Immigrants should renounce their own culture (OLS and IV regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.347∗∗∗ -0.187∗∗ -0.763∗∗∗ -0.542∗∗ -0.420
(0.0804) (0.0840) (0.252) (0.250) (0.369)
F Test: 18.01 17.15 15.68
Municipal Controls: No Yes No No Yes
Personal Controls: No Yes No Yes Yes
Observations: 17946 17946 17946 17946 17946
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “In order to be integrated, immi-
grants should renounce their own culture". Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed
eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landline in
1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status,
economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in KM2, population
density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrant population. Standard errors partially clustered at municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 22: Heterogeneity Analysis - Personal Characteristics (IV Regressions)
Immigrants steal jobs from natives
Gender Working Status Education
Female Male Working Unempl. Low High
Internet share -1.273∗ -1.581∗∗ -1.698∗∗∗ -1.017 -0.001 -1.550∗∗
(0.746) (0.777) (0.596) (1.378) (0.994) (0.650)
Eq. of coef. (p-value) 0.176 0.367 0.021
F Test: 759.0 703.5 1190.8 219.3 501.1 792.0
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 8983 8590 14500 2967 7125 8678
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigrants steal jobs from natives"
(Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include year and province xed
eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental Variable: share of landlines in
1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age, social class, occupational status,
economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population, surface in KM2, population
density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-Saharan African Immigrants
over immigrants population. The row “Eq. of coef. (p-value)" refers to the p-value for a test of equality of coecients for
Internet share across the subsamples. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Table 23: Heterogeneity Analysis - Personal Characteristics (IV Regressions)
Immigrants should not obtain unemployment subsidies
Gender Working Status Education
Female Male Working Unempl. Low High
Internet share -0.0749 -0.913∗∗ -0.400 -1.270 -0.243 -0.359
(0.438) (0.427) (0.328) (0.907) (0.449) (0.512)
Eq. of coef. (p-value) 0.154 0.830 0.660
F Test: 725.6 698.0 1158.5 213.3 764.1 492.5
Controls: Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations: 8982 8616 14534 2958 8616 7195
Dependent Variable: Dummy equal to one if the respondent agrees with the statement: “Immigrants should not obtain
unemployment subsidies" (Blank and Don’t know answers excluded). Years 1995, 1996; 2008-2012. All regressions include
year and province xed eects and are weighted for the number of respondents per municipality-year. Instrumental
Variable: share of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. (Self-reported) Personal controls: gender, age, squared-age,
social class, occupational status, economic status, political preferences and education level. Municipal controls: population,
surface in KM2, population density, altitude, % immigrants over total population, % of EU15 Immigrants and % of Sub-
Saharan African Immigrants over immigrant population. The row “Eq. of coef. (p-value)" refers to the p-value for a test of
equality of coecients for Internet share across the subsamples. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05,
∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table A1: Immigration in Spain - By country of origin
2017 2008 1998
Total Share Total Share Total Share
Total Foreign 4,572,807 5,268,762 637,085
EU (15) 861,852 0.188 1,090,122 0.207 277,844 0.436
UK 240,785 0.053 352,957 0.067 75,600 0.119
Bulgaria 127,669 0.028 153,973 0.029 1,453 0.002
Romania 687,733 0.150 731,806 0.139 2,258 0.004
Ukraine 103,072 0.023 79,096 0.015 462 0.001
Morocco 749,670 0.164 652,695 0.124 111,043 0.174
Argentina 70,221 0.015 147,382 0.028 19,315 0.030
Colombia 145,358 0.032 284,581 0.054 9,997 0.016
Ecuador 141,810 0.031 427,718 0.081 3,972 0.006
China 208,075 0.046 125,914 0.024 11,611 0.018
Source: INE - National Statistics Oce
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Table A2: Summary statistics - Respondents’ characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Age 19293 47.22 17.972
Gender:
Female 19293 0.517 0.500
Male 19293 0.483 0.500
Social class:
High 19293 0.002 0.048
Upper Middle 19293 0.057 0.232
Middle 19293 0.531 0.499
Lower Middle 19293 0.248 0.432
Working 19293 0.136 0.343
Occupational Status:
Employed 19285 0.545 0.498
Retired 19285 0.231 0.422
Unemployed 19285 0.164 0.370
Student 19285 0.054 0.227
Political Ideology:
Centre 19268 0.586 0.493
Left 19268 0.113 0.317
Right 19268 0.061 0.240
Economic Situation:
Very good 19293 0.131 0.338
Good 19293 0.261 0.439
Average 19293 0.388 0.487
Bad 19293 0.166 0.372
Very bad 19293 0.046 0.209
Education level:
No education 19293 0.107 0.309
Primary 19293 0.391 0.488
Secondary 19293 0.191 0.393
Professional 19293 0.135 0.341
University 19293 0.079 0.269
Residual category in order to sum 100%: “Don’t know / Other / Refuse to answer"
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Table A3: Summary statistics - Municipalities’ characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Broadband Lines 19293 62423.350 173511.801
Fixed-phone Lines 19293 182823.227 402981.193
Population 19293 399860.549 829186.532
Area (km2) 19293 209.772 280.838
Altitude 19019 301.591 298.430
Population density 19293 2596.574 3993.772
Real share of immigrant pop. (local) 19155 0.081 0.084
Immigrants from EU (%)1 19057 0.377 0.194
Immigrants from Non EU (%) 1 13110 0.034 0.030
Immigrants from sub-Saharan countries (%)1 13110 0.040 0.043
1 Over the immigrant population;
Table A4: Summary statistics - Outcome variables
Obs. Mean St. Dev.
Immigration is bad for the country overall 17593 0.371 0.483
There are too many immigrants 17810 0.429 0.495
Estimated immigrant share (national) 9711 0.221 0.149
Estimated immigrant share (local) 9972 0.199 0.173
Voted for PP in the last election 19293 0.147 0.354
Immigrants:
Steal natives jobs 18163 0.621 0.485
Force native salaries down 17922 0.733 0.443
Should not be allowed to receive unemployment subsidy 18183 0.088 0.283
Should not be allowed to vote 17094 0.361 0.480
Should not be allowed to gain Spanish nationality 17137 0.183 0.386
Should renounce their culture 18549 0.112 0.316
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Appendix C: Electoral Data Analysis
To generalise the result found in Table 13, in this section I make use of the actual electoral data
downloadable from the Spanish Interior minister. In particular, I look at the electoral performance
of Partido Popular (PP) in a battery of elections before and after the arrival of the Internet: the
congressional elections in 1996 and 2000 (pre) and 2008 and 2011 (post)17. The main equation I
estimate is the following:
PPV oteSharem,t = β1InternetAvailabilitym,t + β2Xm,t + τt + ψm + εm,t (4)
where, the dependent variable is the share of votes – in municipality m in the election year t –
obtained by PP. As in the main body of the analysis, Internet Availability is measured as the ratio
between the number of broadband lines and the population living in a municipality and is equal to 0
in the pre-Internet period. X is a vector which includes several local characteristics. The time-variant
controls I use for this part of the analysis are the (logarithm of the) population, the number of banks,
of commercial activities and cars present in the municipality. X also includes some topographic
features, such as extension and altitude of the municipality. Additionally, I consider other relevant
municipality characteristics coming from 2001 Census, like the share of people below 25, the share
of people aged 65 or above, the percentage of people with a higher level of education, the number of
oces and cultural venues per capita and the average number of child per family. Moreover, I also
control for indexes present in the Census which capture the municipality’s development of tourism,
economic activities, education and the third sector. All those relevant, time-invariant demographic
features are interacted with a year dummy variable to allow for any eect to vary across election
years. Last but not least, I control for regional dummies18 interacted with election-year dummies,
which allows me to tackle any eect of unobservable regional factors over time19. This allows to
take into account the possibility of pre-existing or underlying trends that could confound the causal
interpretation of my estimated coecients. Finally, τt and ψm are, respectively, a set of year and
municipality xed eects.
17Given the lack of clear data about Internet diusion in 2004, I will not consider the election round that took place in
that year. An additional source of concern that led me not to consider in my analysis the 2004 elections is the terrorist
attack that took place few days before the vote.
18In Spain there are 17 Comunidad Autonomas or CC.AA. characterised by a very heterogeneous level of development.
19The same results hold if I introduce the interaction with the 50 provinces instead of the CC.AA.
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As already highlighted, the introduction of municipalities xed eects, with observation coming
before and after the introduction of the Internet technology, allows to overcome estimation bias
that comes from unobserved time-persistent factors; to alleviate bias linked with unobservable time-
varying factors that aect both political outcomes and access to the Internet, broadband availability
is instrumented in the following way:
InternetAvailabilitym,t = γ1(Landlines1996m ∗PostInternet)+γ2Xm,t+αt+ ζm+ηm,t (5)
where Landlines1996 is the time-invariant number of xed telephone lines (over the total popu-
lation) present in municipal m in 1996, while αt and ζm are year and municipality xed eects. As
in the main analysis, the underlying identication assumption is that whatever correlation existed
between the number of landlines and relevant municipality characteristics, this did not change at
the time of introduction of the broadband technology.
Table B1 present the OLS and IV results. The table has the following structure: column (1) shows
the OLS results, column (2) moves to the IV identication strategy, adding municipal controls and
region (x year) xed eects in column (3). Finally, column (4) presents a falsication test: similar
to Campante et al. (2017) and Falck et al. (2014), I run the same IV regression of Column (4) just
for the pre-Internet elections (namely 1996 and 2000) assuming that the pattern of Internet share in
2000 is equal to 2008 one. In line with the results found in Table 13, Table B1 conrms that Internet
diusion leads to a decrease in the vote share for the right-wing party PP. Indeed, both the OLS and
the IV coecients (with and without controls) are negative and strongly signicant. Also in this case
a downward bias of the OLS coecient is observable, while the big reduction of the magnitude of
coecient between Columns (2) and (3) suggests that the introduction of controls is very relevant.
In the most complete specication, the Internet eect on voting behaviour is quite relevant: given
an average vote share for PP in 1996 and 2000 of 39.5%, going from zero to full broadband access
would correspond to a decline in its political success of about 33 percentage points. It is important to
highlight that the placebo test works well: coecient in column (4) is insignicant and almost equal
to zero. As an additional robustness check, I also run the equation having as dependent variable the
share of vote calculated over the total number of eligible voters, as opposed to the number of voters
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who actually turned out. This would address some estimation bias due to a change in voting turnout,
given that the literature has identied a negative Internet eect on electoral participation. Results
(available upon request) are mostly identical.
Table B1: Internet impact on PP votes (OLS and IV regression) - Electoral data
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS IV IV IV
Internet share -0.115∗∗∗ -0.972∗∗∗ -0.131∗∗
(0.0140) (0.0503) (0.0548)
Internet Share Fake -0.0405
(0.0466)
Mean % PP vote (1996 and 2000) 0.395
First Stage: - 0.232∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ -
F Test: - 32.09 21.13 16.21
Controls: No No Yes Yes
Observations: 12895 12895 12690 6282
Years: 1996, 2000, 2008 and 2011. All regressions include year and municipality xed eects. Instrumental Variable:
number of landlines in 1996 * Post Internet dummy. Column (4) is a falsication test. Time-varying demographic controls:
(Log) population, unemployment rate, cars, banks and commercial activities per capita. Demographic Controls from 2001
census: % people under 25, % people over 65, % people with not-compulsory education, the average number of children;
oces, and cultural venues per capita; extension and altitude of the municipality. Region xed eects are interacted with
a year dummy in Columns 3, 4 and 5. Robust standard errors clustered at the municipal level in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.1,
∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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